because states consider that it grants privileges and immunities that go beyond what is functionally necessary for a special mission. Until relatively recently, the paucity of authorities resulted in some uncertainty as to whether members of a special mission were entitled to immunity under customary international law. States rarely have to assert claims to such immunity: special missions are usually short in duration, and issues of immunity are normally dealt with through diplomatic channels, or national prosecutors decline to prosecute long before governments or courts are required to assert or adjudicate on immunity.
The Court of Appeal paid tribute to the judgment of the Divisional Court (at [10] ), for showing "that there is a very considerable amount of evidence of different types to satisfy [the requirements of state practice and opinio juris in favour of immunities for special missions] . . . and very little against" (at [78] ). Additional evidence presented to the Court of Appeal served only to reinforce this conclusion. Moreover, "[n]o state has taken action or adopted a practice inconsistent with the recognition of such immunities. No state has asserted that they do not exist" (at [79] ). The Court of Appeal's judgment -like that of the Divisional Court -is notable not just for addressing a hitherto unsettled point of international law but also for its careful and methodological approach to the identification of customary international law. In addition to looking for a widespread, representative and consistent practice of states that is accepted as a legal obligation under international law, the judgment considers the relationship between customary international law and treaty law (at [21] ) and the relevance of affected states (at [82] ). Both courts sought to follow the International Law Commission (ILC)'s 2016 draft conclusions on the Identification of Customary International Law as "a valuable source of the principles on this subject", noting that, while these were not the final product, they represented the work of "some of the most qualified jurists drawn from across the world who have debated the matter most thoroughly between themselves over an extended period of time" (at [18] , stressing that the conclusions must be read with the commentaries). These words of endorsement confirm the potential importance of the work of the ILC for the determination of rules of international law, whether as a subsidiary means under Article 38 (1)(d) The Court of Appeal nevertheless appeared to go beyond the methodology for identifying customary international law when it explained that "[i]f an international court had to consider the question whether a member of a special mission enjoyed the core immunities as a matter of customary international law, it would have regard to the importance and long ). Responses to questionnaires may be evidence of opinio juris and they may point to state practice, but how far they may be regarded in and of themselves as state practice is another matter.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that, although older authorities had described customary international law as part of the common law, "the better view is [that] customary international law is a source of common law rules, but will only be received into the common law if such reception is compatible with general principles of domestic constitutional law" (at A.C. 1355 -namely, that "the presumption when considering any such policy issue is that [customary international law], once established, can and should shape the common law, whenever it can do so consistently with domestic constitutional principles, statutory law and common law rules which the courts can themselves sensibly adapt without it being, for example, necessary to invite Parliamentary intervention or consideration" (Keyu, at [150] , emphasis added). The presumption "reflects the policy of the common law that it should be in alignment with the common customary law applicable between nations" (at [117] ). The position is different for unincorporated treaties, since the UK constitution assigns to the executive the authority to make treaties but not the power to alter domestic law unilaterally. According to the Court, the "common law is more receptive to the adoption of rules of customary international law because of the very demanding nature of the test to establish whether a rule of customary international law exists . . . . This is not something that the Crown can achieve by its own unilateral action by simple agreement with one other state" (ibid.). This explanation is not entirely convincing: it assumes too much about the ease of concluding treaties and the degree to which the test for customary international law is demanding. It also overlooks the fact that C.L.J. 3 Case and Comment use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197319000138 unincorporated treaties may have a role to play in deciding questions of English law and that the executive of certain states sometimes exercises a disproportionate influence in the shaping of customary international law.
The Court rejected the argument that Parliament is the more appropriate body to decide whether to incorporate the core special mission immunities into English law. Not only is there no constitutional reason that the rules should not be part of domestic law, but their recognition "is in accord with [the] constitutional principle in the present case that the courts should act to ensure that the United Kingdom abides by its obligations under international law" (at The Court also rejected the argument that it was creating a "nonreviewable discretion in the executive to confer immunity upon individuals simply by agreeing to accept them . . . as members of a special mission" (at [122] ). The receiving state's consent is an essential characteristic of a special mission under customary international law; it protects the receiving state from having to confer immunity "upon anyone that the sending state wishes to designate as a member of a special mission" (at [130] ). It is not contrary to constitutional principle that the UK benefits from this protection, and the decision whether to accept a special mission falls squarely within the executive's constitutional role of carrying out international relations. While a decision to accept a special mission may affect individual rights under domestic law, it does not alter or suspend the law contrary to Article 1 of the Bill of Rights ( Minor quibbles aside, the Court of Appeal (like the Divisional Court) has not only clarified the position of special mission immunity under customary international law and English law but in doing so has set an example for the rigorous and systematic application of the methodology for the identification of customary international law, and provided further evidence that English judges have embraced Brierly's contention that "international law is not a part, but is one of the sources, of English law" ((1935) 
